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Labour Supply Effects of a Subsidised 
Old-Age Part-Time Scheme in Austria
*
 
In this paper we evaluate the impact of the old-age part-time scheme (OAPT) on the Austrian 
labour market which was a policy to allow flexible retirement options for the elderly with an 
aim to increase labour supply. According to our matching estimates employment probability 
increases slightly, especially in the first two years after entrance into the programme. 
Furthermore, the programme seems to reduce the measured unemployment risk. However, 
the total number of hours worked is significantly reduced by OAPT. While the policy is meant 
to reduce early exit from the labour force by allowing part-time work, our analysis indicates 
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1. Introduction 
Phased retirement is an often mentioned slogan in policy debates. This retirement option would allow 
workers to stay with their current employer, but with reduced hours and effort. From a socio-
psychological point of view, phased retirement is meant to ease the often sudden change of life pace, 
allowing a more gradual reduction of responsibilities as well as stress; thus reducing pension shocks 
and allowing a more fulfilling end of a lifetime of work. On the other hand, phased retirement can help 
to preserve valuable firm-specific human capital in the workplace: While elderly workers might have 
trouble to compete with younger colleagues in terms of speed and physical fitness as well as in terms 
of the length of attention span or the ability to concentrate for longer periods (Skirbekk, 2004), in other 
tasks like verbal or organizational skills elder workers are often better. These are in particular firm-
specific skills which are very valuable to the firm. Phased retirement might be a good option to 
preserve these skills for the firm. In spite of these alleged advantages, phased retirement is rare in 
most countries (Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006).  
Austria introduced a special subsidy program for phased retirement schemes in the year 2000. While 
the aforementioned arguments played a role in the discussion of the law, labour market policy was 
important as well. Austria traditionally has had a relatively high unemployment rate of elderly workers 
together with generally low participation and employment rates of the concerned age group: Given that 
labour demand is inflexible and does not provide enough part-time jobs for elderly workers who want 
such phased retirement, introducing subsidies might increase labour force attachment of elderly 
workers. On the other hand, allowing phased retirement might reduce labour force attachment 
because it can lead to a form of early retirement.  
In this paper we evaluate the Austrian Old-Age Part-Time Scheme (OAPT) using a matching approach 
looking at employment and unemployment probabilities as well as the number of hours worked. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the OAPT scheme. 
Section 3 presents theoretical consideration and international evidence. Section 4 describes the 
evaluation methodology. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Old-Age Part-Time Scheme in Austria 
The Austrian Old-Age Part-Time Scheme
2 provides benefits paid to employers in connection with 
working time reductions of older employees. The scheme is based on a bilateral agreement between 
the employer and the employee on a working time reduction of between 40% and 60% of working 
hours prior to the working time reduction. Eligible workers must have had a full-time job before the 
subsidised scheme with working hours at least at 80% of a regular full-time employment. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
2 The Austrian old-age employment scheme “Altersteilzeit”  underwent several changes since its introduction in January 2000. 
The following discussion focuses on the second ‘regime’, as it was in place from September 2000 to December 2003. 3 
The entry conditions implied a compensatory wage (Lohnausgleich) up to a total gross salary of 75% of the 
compensation before the reduction of working time. Furthermore, social security contributions had to be 
paid at the same amount as before the working time reduction
3. The minimum access age was set to 50 
years of age for female employees and to 55 for men, respectively. Eligibility required, moreover on the part 
of the worker previous regular employment periods of at least 780 weeks within the last 25 years. While a 
first version of the scheme required on the part of the employer the hiring of an additional employee 
(Ersatzarbeitskraft), this requirement was abolished later on – in the period we are observing. The subsidy 
period was fixed at a maximum of 6 ½ years. 
Moreover, the second regime of the OAPT scheme provided for a relatively flexible allocation of working 
time. OAPT employment could be split into a period of full-time employment followed by a non-working 
period at the end, as long as the agreed reduction of working hours was reached on average over the total 
period – which can be considered as a form of early retirement. The OECD in particular noted this issue: 
“To a considerable extent participants in AT have allocated ‘part-time work’ such that they work full-time 
during the first years covered by the scheme and cease working during the remainder of this period” (OECD 
2005, 51). 
To summarize: the advantage of OAPT for employers is that the firm can reduce the amount of 
working hours of elderly workers with an equivalent reduction in monthly wage costs; on the other 
hand, workers can adapt actual working hours closer to optimal hours while most of the reduction in 
working time is compensated for by the government.
4 
Participation structure in the Austrian scheme 
In 2006 more than 30,000 employees participated in the Austrian OAPT-scheme. The highest take-up 
was reached in 2004 with the number of participants reaching almost 40.000. According to the Federal 
Ministry for Labour and Commerce total expenditures for promoting the OAPT-scheme amounted to 
455.9 million EUR in 2006. In 2004 the share of OAPT related expenditures (563.5 Mio. EUR) 
accounted for three quarters of total expenditure spent on active labour market policy for over 45 year 
old workers (see BMWA 2005). An empirical assessment of this important programme is therefore long 
overdue.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
3 In Austria social security contributions are calculated as a fixed percentage from the gross salary. This gross salary serves as a 
calculation basis (Beitragsgrundlage) for contributions which are split into an employer’s and a employee’s part (Dienstgeber- 
und Dienstnehmeranteil). Within the old-age part-time scheme social security contributions by the employer still have to be paid 
in full. The employee’s payments are calculated with respect to the new gross salary (including the compensatory wage). The 
remaining difference to the prior contribution payments has to be paid by the employer.  
4 Schnalzenberger and Winter-Ebmer (2008) study another feature of Austrian legislation which was meant to protect 
employment of elderly workers: a layoff tax of elderly workers.  4 
Table 1 illustrates the structure of OAPT participants relative to a reference population of employees 
50 years and older. The description accounts for gender, Federal province, industry, firm size, firm 
employment dynamics and real income. Regarding gender, men form the larger part of participants 
(53.4%). Relative to the reference population of employees aged 50 years and over, however, female 
participants are marginally over represented among OAPT participants. With regard to regional 
structure the population size is more or less reflected within the participation structure. With a 
cumulative share of almost 70% Vienna, Lower Austria and Upper Austria together contain a majority 
of participants. Compared to the reference population, the latter two regions show a marginal over-
representation of OAPT participants. The industry structure indicates that OAPT is most commonly 
used in the manufacturing sector, trade, and public administration including the health sector and 
education. Compared to the industry structure of the entire population of older workers manufacturing 
and financial intermediation are over-represented. In contrast, the share of older workers employed in 
the public administration is higher than among OAPT participants. A majority of OAPT participants are 
employed in larger firms with more the 250 employees. Larger firms' share of participants is 
considerably higher than the share of older workers in larger firms generally, indicating that OAPT is 
more commonly used in larger enterprises. Regarding the dispersion of participants by real income our 
results indicate that OAPT is more commonly used by workers with higher earnings. About one quarter 
of OAPT participants earns more than 3,500 EUR
5 and only 16% less than 1,800 EUR. In 2006 the 
median income of 50 to 54 years old workers was 1,970 EUR and 2,090 EUR for 55 to 60 years old 
workers. The median income of OAPT participants was 2,680 EUR. In order to examine the 
employment dynamics at the firm level we compare firm sizes at the beginning and at the end of the 
observation period. Therefore we differentiate between firms with a decreasing, stagnating or 
increasing number of employees over time
6. The largest part of OAPT participation is from firms with 
declining employment (42 %). Only every fourth OAPT participant works in a growing firm. 
 
3.  Theoretical approach and international evidence 
The original policy argumentation behind the OAPT scheme was to raise employment incentives for 
older workers and to defer retirement decisions. The research question underlying the following 
discussion is, whether and to what extent the Austrian OAPT scheme has a positive or negative effect 
on older workers’ labour supply. In other words, in which way does the part-time scheme determine 
retirement decisions and the remaining number of hours worked.  
In a simple labour supply model decisions are determined by workers’ preferences. Under the 
assumption that employers are indifferent about the number of hours worked by an individual worker, 
workers are free to choose the number of working hours at a given wage according to their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
5 All earnings had been deflated to a year 2000 basis. 
6 Based on the average number of employees in the first half of the observation period (2000-2003) compared to the second 
half (2004-2007). By definition ‘stagnating firms’ show an employment variation between +/-10%. ‘Increasing/decreasing firms’ 
grew/declined at a higher rate.  5 
preferences between consumption and leisure. In practice employers might have preferences 
regarding the number of hours worked by each employee. Due to fixed employment costs or 
coordination costs employers might limit their labour demand to a specific minimum number of working 
hours (see Gielen 2007, Charles and DeCicca 2006). Such minimum hours constraints might be due 
to some sort of team work in the firm: efficiency will require that all team members are present most of 
the time; reduced hours of one worker will have negative consequences for the productivity of the 
others. Supervisory costs could be another reason why reduced hours of some workers are costly to 
the firm. Finally, issues of work organization, assembly lines or workplace equipment might make it 
costly to allow part-time work.  
Figure 1 describes the decision process of a worker underlying such constraints on weekly working 
time. As the worker values hours of leisure and consumption positively she faces a trade off between 
more leisure or more consumption. If  she could choose freely the number of hours of work per week, 
she would choose 20 hours (A), but if the firm has fixed employment costs, only 0 (B) or 40 hours (C) 
are possible: depending on the preferences for leisure, which might be relatively high for workers 
above age 50, some workers might choose 0 hours and opt for some form of “early retirement” which 
might be either unemployment or other forms of inactivity, including retirement due to health reasons, 
etc.  
Survey results indicate that especially older workers would prefer to reduce working time (Prager and 
Schleiter 2006, EEIG 2004). Charles and De Cicca (2006, 252) argue that in the absence of 
possibilities to reduce working time workers might leave the labour market completely and opt for early 
retirement. Based on survey data they show that workers, who faced stricter hours constraints at an 
earlier point of time, were much more likely to be retired at a later point than their unconstrained peers. 
Thus hours constraints can increase older workers’ incentives for early retirement and thus have a 
negative effect on older workers’ labour supply. If this is the case an OAPT scheme can be used as an 
instrument to reduce hours constraints and, in turn, to boost older workers’ labour supply. The OAPT 
scheme can have a positive effect on older workers’ labour supply if they are able to bargain a working 
time reduction according to their preferences instead of having to leave the labour market completely 
due to the absence of such a possibility.  
The approach presented above requires an existing alternative option for early retirement. If this is not 
available, i.e. leaving the labour market into early retirement is not possible, it is not clear how an 
introduction of an OAPT scheme could increase labour supply of older workers. The availability of 
early retirement options, alongside other dimensions such as health status, depends on the age of the 
workers. One has to keep in mind that the eligibility age to the OAPT scheme in Austria was age 50 for 
women and age 55 for men. According to EUROSTAT data the average exit age from the Austrian 
labour force in 2002 was 59.2 years for women and 59.4 years for men. Within the scope of the 2000 
pension reform the access age for early retirement was raised to 56 ½ years for women and 61 ½ 
years for men. Against the background of relatively low eligibility ages for OAPT on the one hand, and 
stricter age eligibility for early retirement on the other hand, the OAPT scheme can be considered 6 
more as a bridge into (early) retirement. It has to be seen how an increase in hours-flexibility can 
mitigate this strong incentive for a reduced labour supply.  
There is not much research on labour supply effects of age-specific subsidies. Gielen (2007) analyses 
the labour market transitions of hours-constrained workers in the UK labour market, i.e. for workers 
who would prefer to work fewer hours. Based on a competing risk approach she models employment 
durations of workers over 50 years old. Under the assumption that leaving the labour market is only 
one possible alternative for hours-constrained workers she differentiates between five destination 
states: retirement, inactivity (for example unemployment), hours reduction with the current employer 
and changing employers with or without reducing working hours. Gielen (2007) applies data from the 
British Household Panel Survey over the period 1991-2004. The dataset comprises information on 
workers’ preferences on working hours assuming the same amount of compensation per hour and on 
whether workers would prefer to work fewer hours, more hours or continue with the same number of 
working hours. Additionally, the data contain information on the workers’ satisfaction with the number 
of working hours. Gielen’s results indicate that a reduction of hours constraints could prolong the 
working lives of older women. Hours-constrained older women having to work too many hours leave 
the labour market earlier. On the other hand, men working more than the preferred hours tend to be 
able to adjust working hours with their current employer. In contrast to women over-employment has 
no effect on male retirement behaviour. It seems that men either have a larger bargaining power 
against their employers or their imbalance in terms of working hours is not so big.  
Regarding the ‘activation’ effect of hours-flexibility, Gielen (2007) differentiates between active working 
years and total labour supply in hours. As mentioned above, increasing hours-flexibility can prolong 
labour force participation of over-employed female workers. On the other hand, total labour supply in 
terms of hours may decrease if there is an opportunity to reduce working hours. Assuming that hours 
constraints induce older workers to opt for working full-time or not at all, an over-employed worker 
might leave the labour market completely or stay (over-) employed with the same number of working 
hours. Introducing hours-flexibility might raise the labour supply in comparison to a state where a 
worker would have left the labour market completely. Conversely, hours-flexibility might have a 
lowering effect on total labour supply if the person had stayed employed with the same number of 
working hours instead of decreasing the number of hours worked. The net employment effect depends 
on the relative size of these effects.  
The old-age part time scheme can thus be seen as an instrument to increase the hours-flexibility of 
older workers. Lowering hours constraints might have a positive supply effect in terms of prolonging 
labour force participation. The net supply effect however depends on alternative labour market 
behaviours (counterfactually) and therefore is an empirical question. Some European countries 
introduced a similar form of subsidized part-time scheme for older workers, but the evaluation 
literature is not very comprehensive. Wadensjö (2006) estimated the effect of the Swedish partial-
pension scheme on the total number of hours worked. His results indicate that the positive supply 
effect – whereby participants work part-time instead of opting for an early retirement route – outweighs 
the negative effect of workers reducing working time instead of continuing in full-time employment. 7 
Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2006) analysed the Finish partial pension scheme and found no effects 
on the timing of retirement. 
With regard to the labour market effects of the German Old-Age Part-Time Scheme Eichhorst (2006) 
comes to a rather critical assessment. Similar to the Austrian scheme the German OAPT offers the 
possibility to allocate ‘part-time’ work into a full-time period in the first half of OAPT and a leisure 
period in the second half. According to Eichhorst (2006, p. 11) this ‘blocking-modell’ provides an 
incentive against a more gradual transition from employment into retirement. In practice the blocking-
option encourages older workers to leave the labour market earlier at the beginning of the ‘leisure-
period’. As in Austria, the German OAPT-scheme requires the hiring of an additional employee. 
Regarding the intended positive labour demand effect of this requirement, Wagner (2009) points to the 
risk of dead-weight effects, when extra recruitment would have occurred even without participation in 
the OAPT Scheme. In 2002 a Part-Time-Scheme for older workers was introduced in Belgium (see 
Devisscher and Sanders 2007, Devisscher, 2004). The so-called career-break allowed employees to 
reduce the number of working hours for a maximum of five years without losing their social security 
rights e.g. pension benefits of a fulltime work regime. Devisscher and Sanders (2007, 8-9) state “its 
use has until quite recently been limited to a rather privileged group of persons”, referring to the 
specific participation structure in the career-break scheme – a large share of participants belonging to 
two-earner households, the scheme being used relatively more in the services sector than in 
industries and employees of larger companies making more use of career breaks than employees in 
smaller enterprises. These authors refer to an evaluation of the career break scheme carried out by 
OSA/Steunpunt WAV in 2006. The results are based on the survey analysis of career paths of career 
breakers before, during and after their career break. The career paths of career breakers were 
compared with those of a control group of employees without a career break. The results provide “no 
evidence that the activity rate of over 50 [year old] persons with a career break is higher (one to three 
years after the career break) than that of a control group of 50-plus employees, rather on the contrary.” 
4. Evaluation  approach 
We base our analysis on the prototypical treatment model of the microeconometric evaluation 
literature, the binary potential outcome model (Rubin causal model). For individual  , ... 1 , N i i =  let 
) 1 ( i Y  denote the potential response of individual i  being exposed to the treatment and  ) 0 ( i Y  the 
potential response if i  receives no treatment, where  { } 1 , 0 = i D  is the indicator of exposure to 
treatment.  
We investigate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which focuses explicitly on the 
effects for those the treatment is intended. It is given by  )) 1 ( | ) 0 ( ( )) 1 ( | ) 1 ( ( D Y E D Y E ATT − = Δ . 
The first part of the expression can be identified for the treatment group subsample; the second part is 
counterfactual and not identifiable without invoking further assumptions. The unconfoundedness 
assumption (i) and the overlap assumption (ii) ensure that the matching estimator identifies and 8 
consistently estimates the ATT:
7 For all  x in the support of  X , (i) D  is independent of () ) 1 ( ), 0 ( Y Y  
conditional on  x X = ; and (ii)  ( ) c x X D P c − < = = < 1 | 1 , for some  0 > c . The 
unconfoundedness assumption is often controversial, as it assumes that there are no (unobserved) 
characteristics of the individuals associated both with the potential outcomes and the treatments, 
besides the observed covariates  X .  
In this paper we apply the Abadie-Imbens (nearest neighbour) matching estimator with bias-correction 
(Abadie and Imbens 2002, 2007). The simple matching estimator for the ATT estimates the 
unobserved outcome by averaging the observed outcomes for the observations l of the opposite 
treatment group that are chosen as matches for i
8. In contrast to propensity score matching, the 
matching is performed on the covariates  X
9.  
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This simple matching estimator will be biased in finite samples due to the differences between the 
covariates of the matched observations and their matches. Abadie and Imbens (2002, 2007) suggest 
regression methods to reduce the bias. The bias-corrected matching estimator uses an adjustment, 
which is based on the estimate of the regression function  { } x X d Y x d = Ε = | ) ( ) ( μ  for  0 = d . The 
regression function is approximated by a linear function and estimated by using least squares on the 
matched observations. Given the estimated regression functions, the missing potential outcome is 
now predicted as  
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We use the following formula for estimating the variance of the ATT: 
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5. Empirical  results 
We estimate the effect of OAPT on employment, full-time equivalent employment, and unemployment 
for a four year evaluation period starting with the entrance in OAPT. The results for three and five year 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 See Abadie und Imbens (2002, 2007) for further technical assumptions. 
8 
1 N is the number of treated individuals. Let  ) (i Jm denote the set of indices for the matches of unit  i that are at least as close 
as the m-th match. The number of elements of  ) (i J m is denoted by  ) ( # i J M . Let  ) (i KM denote the number of times i  is used 
as a match for all observation  l  of the opposite treatment group, each time weighted by the total number of matches for 
observation  l  (see Abadie et al. 2004). 
9 We use the Stata procedure nnmatch (Abadie et al. 2004) in our estimation. The diagonal matrix constructed of the inverses of 
the variances of each element of 
i X is used for the metric for measuring the distance between two vectors of covariates. We 
set the number of matches m=4. 
10 This assumes that the treatment effect,  () ( ), 0 1 i i Y Y −  is constant and that the conditional outcome variance does not vary with 
either the covariates or the treatment (see Abadie und Imbens 2006 for theoretical justifications for various variance estimators). 9 
periods are presented as robustness checks. We take the data from AMDB (Arbeitsmarktdatenbank), 
a very informative individual administrative database for all gainful employed Austrian workers. AMDB 
combines information from the social security records and from registers of the Austrian public 
employment office (AMS). This data set is matched with administrative information for the participants 
of OAPT.  
We select the birth cohorts 1943/44 (males), and 1946/47 (females), respectively. Only for these 
cohorts the observation period is long enough. The treatment group includes all participants entering 
the OAPT scheme between 2000 and 2003. For the construction of the control group we select all 
workers, who were employed at least one day in the period 2000/2001 in the private sector of the 
Austrian economy. For the control group we simulate a hypothetical start date for enrolment in the 
OAPT scheme and drop all workers not employed at this date. This procedure leads to a sample of 
3,210 participants and 28,651 non-participants (females), and 6,142 and 23,810 (males), respectively. 
As expected we find considerable differences in the characteristics between participants and non-
participants, therefore we apply the matching procedure suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2002, 
2007). 
Matching is valid only if the assumption of conditional unconfoundedness is fulfilled, which means that 
the selection bias is only due to observed variables. This assumption is also known as selection on 
observables or conditional independence. We need to condition on all variables jointly influencing the 
participation decision and the outcome variables for fulfilling the assumption. Our data set contains a 
rich set of variables. We have information on socio-demographic variables (gender, sickness days, 
etc.), labour market history, and firm specific data (industry, employment dynamics, etc.). We use the 
following matching variables: employment days per year (1 to 3 years before entrance in the OAPT), 
unemployment, sickness absence (3 years before entrance), tenure, white-collar or blue-collar worker 
status, income, region, employment dynamics of the firm, industry, and firm size. For age cohorts we 
used an exact matching. Additionally, the information for the comparison as well as the treatment 
group is from the same data set and is measured at the same point of time. Given this rich dataset, we 
can argue that the assumption of unconfoundedness is justified in our case. 
In Tables 2 and 3 we show evidence on the balancing properties of our matching estimator. Whereas 
in Table 2 absolute means and standard deviations of our control variables are shown, Table 3 
presents normalized differences between treated and controls, on the one hand, and between treated 
and matched controls, on the other hand. The quality of the matches appears very high as the average 
difference within the matched pairs is very small compared to the average difference between treated 
and control group before matching.
11  
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
11 The normalised difference exceeds 0.05 only for the female variables income (0.148) and sickness leave (0.056). Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009) cite that linear regression methods tend to be sensitive to the specification if the normalized difference 
exceeds one quarter. Note that we use a bias-corrected matching estimator.  10 
Table 4 shows the estimated labour market impact of OAPT. Two output measures for the employment 
effect are used. First, we consider the impact on days in employment; then the impact on total hours 
worked is analysed. We assume that all workers profiting from the OAPT scheme have reduced their 
working time by 50 percent. Finally we look at the impact on unemployment. Note that workers on a 
part-time scheme are counted as employed in national statistics during the full time of their contract – 
regardless of any timing or blocking of the work load. Our estimates suggest that employment is 
slightly increased by the OAPT. Over a four year period participants work longer (15 days for males, 
and 23 days for females). This corresponds to an increase of the employment probability of 1 and 1.6 
percentage points, respectively. However, the treatment effect is significantly positive only in the first 
two years after entrance in OAPT (see Figure 2). For the fourth and fifth year we find even negative 
effects which results in a cumulative negative effect of OAPT on official employment figures once the 
full five year period is taken into account. Note that this employment measure does not take into 
account that OAPT participants work only part-time. Our second employment measure indicates that 
OAPT significantly reduces total hours worked. Over a four year period employment in full-time 
equivalents is reduced by 29 percentage points (males), and 25 percentage points (females), 
respectively.  
Finally, for unemployment our matching results indicate that unemployment is reduced by the OAPT 
scheme: Measured unemployment is reduced over a three-to-five year period by one to one and a half 
month.  
We can use our matching results to make a back-of-the-envelope calculation to estimate the 
aggregate effects of OAPT for the age group 50-65 years. We can make us of the share of workers in 
this age category participating in the OAPT to calculate aggregate employment effects.  As the OAPT 
is primarily reducing working time of the participating individuals, abolishing the scheme would imply 
that employment in full-time equivalents increases by 1.5 percentage points. On the other hand, the 
measured unemployment rate would increase by 0.2 percentage points. Given the relatively high 
public expenditures, OAPT is certainly an inefficient measure to support employment of the elderly. 
6. Conclusions 
Austria introduced a heavily subsidized old-age part-time scheme in 2000 which became very popular 
soon. In 2004 almost 40.000 workers participated and expenditures for the scheme amounted to 
0.25 % of GDP. One aim of the scheme was to increase attachment of older workers to the labour 
market by providing a more worker-friendly phasing- out of working life. However, our results indicate 
that most workers substituted part-time work for full-time work. The labour supply of older workers, 
measured by the total numbers of hours worked, decreased significantly. 
Our findings are in line with the experiences of other countries concerning part-time and partial 
pension schemes. These schemes don’t seem to be successful in prolonging working life but rather to 
act as alternative pathways in early retirement. Given the enormous costs, further reforms in the 
design of the scheme are necessary. First of all, the entrance age into the scheme should be oriented 11 
towards statutory retirement age in order to arrange phasing out of working life around (!) usual 
retirement age and, thus, actually increasing final retirement age. Second the blocking option should 
be banned. This would reduce the attractiveness of the scheme but also the deadweight loss.  12 
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Table 1: Structure of OAPT participants 
 
   OAPT-Participants Employees  50+
(1) 
   abs. rel.  abs.  rel. 
 Sex             
 Males  30,721  53.4  285,930  57.5 
 Females  26,795  46.6  211,766  42.5 
 Federal state         
   Burgenland  1,435  2.5  12,544  2.5 
   Carinthia  2,472  4.3  27,279  5.5 
   Lower Austria  11,797  20.5  78,015  15.7 
   Upper Austria  13,048  22.7  83,487  16.8 
   Salzburg  3,404  5.9  35,390  7.1 
   Styria  5,890  10.2  56,424  11.3 
   Tyrol  2,578  4.5  34,198  6.9 
   Vorarlberg  1,934  3.4  20,517  4.1 
   Vienna  14,958  26.0  134,325  27.0 
 Industry         
   Agriculture and Forestry  478  0.8  5,891  1.2 
   Energy/Mining  1,979  3.4  9,759  2.0 
   Manufacturing  18,561  32.3  104,630  21.0 
   Construction  3,463  6.0  43,999  8.8 
   Trade  9,646  16.8  79,909  16.1 
   Hotels and Restaurants  1,109  1.9  21,178  4.3 
   Transport  1,940  3.4  27,847  5.6 
   Financial Intermediation  4,513  7.8  22,832  4.6 
   Business Activities  4,091  7.1  52,248  10.5 
   Public Administration
 (3) 9,151  15.9  102,497  20.6 
   Other Services  2,438  4.2  26,418  5.3 
   Unknown  147  0.3  488  0.1 
 Firm Size         
   0 - 10 Employees  10,159  17.7  98,452  19.8 
   11 - 50 Employees  9,207  16.0  102,904  20.7 
   51 - 250 Employees  14,212  24.7  118,212  23.8 
   250+ Employees  23,925  41.6  178,128  35.8 
 Real Income         
  Median in EUR  2,677    2,033
(6)  
 N    57,516    497,696   
 
1) Reference population formed by over-50 year-old employees (Day of record: 31th of May 2006). 
3) including Education and Health. 
4) expressed in prices of year 2000 earnings. 
(6) Mean of 50 to 54 years old workers and 55 to 59 years old workers. (Source: Hauptverband der 
Sozialversicherungsträger) 
Source: AMDB, IHS. 
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Table 2: Matching Variables: Covariates of Treatment and Matched Controls 
 
  Females Males 
  Treatment Matched  controls Treatment Matched  controls 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  Employment  Year  1  361.2 28.21 362.2 23.71 361.6 25.67 362.4 22.26 
  Employment  Year  2  359.9 34.70 361.2 30.29 360.6 32.66 361.5 29.58 
  Employment  Year  3  359.1 38.40 360.0 35.87 359.2 38.55 360.0 35.87 
  Tenure  4527.4 3192.22 4365.2 3032.82 4869.1 3734.49 4832.7 3558.14 
  Birth  year  1947  or  1944  0.725 0.45 0.725 0.45 0.587 0.49 0.587 0.49 
  Unemployment  (1-3  years)  0.011 0.06 0.009 0.05 0.009 0.06 0.008 0.05 
  Sickness  leave  (1-3  years)  7.232 32.68 4.828 27.60 4.593 25.52 3.071 21.04 
  Accident  benefit    0.008 0.09 0.007 0.08 0.019 0.14 0.019 0.14 
  Firm  Employment  Dynamics  2.037 0.68 2.042 0.63 2.024 0.69 2.025 0.66 
  White-Collar-Worker  0.768 0.42 0.758 0.43 0.697 0.46 0.688 0.46 
  Federal  States  (Vienna)          
  Unknown  0.008 0.09 0.008 0.09 0.006 0.08 0.006 0.08 
  Burgenland  0.028 0.17 0.028 0.16 0.019 0.14 0.019 0.14 
  Carinthia  0.039 0.19 0.039 0.19 0.031 0.17 0.030 0.17 
  Lower  Austria  0.201 0.40 0.198 0.40 0.204 0.40 0.200 0.40 
  Upper  Austria  0.200 0.40 0.196 0.40 0.198 0.40 0.197 0.40 
  Salzburg  0.064 0.25 0.064 0.24 0.054 0.23 0.054 0.23 
  Styria  0.099 0.30 0.098 0.30 0.090 0.29 0.089 0.28 
  Tyrol  0.044 0.20 0.043 0.20 0.040 0.20 0.040 0.20 
  Vorarlberg  0.024 0.15 0.024 0.15 0.038 0.19 0.037 0.19 
  Industry  (Other  Services)          
  Unknown  0.003 0.05 0.003 0.05 0.003 0.05 0.003 0.05 
  Agriculture  0.005 0.07 0.005 0.07 0.013 0.11 0.013 0.11 
  Energy/Mining  0.009 0.10 0.009 0.10 0.036 0.19 0.036 0.19 
  Manufacturing  0.236 0.42 0.234 0.42 0.388 0.49 0.394 0.49 
  Construction  0.051 0.22 0.050 0.22 0.069 0.25 0.070 0.25 
  Trade  0.189 0.39 0.189 0.39 0.187 0.39 0.184 0.39 
 Hotels and Restaurants  0.033  0.18  0.032  0.18  0.011  0.10  0.011  0.10 
  Transport  0.035 0.18 0.034 0.18 0.030 0.17 0.030 0.17 
  Financial  Intermediation  0.073 0.26 0.073 0.26 0.076 0.26 0.076 0.27 
  Business  Activities  0.089 0.29 0.088 0.28 0.070 0.25 0.069 0.25 
  Public  Administration  0.220 0.41 0.225 0.42 0.083 0.28 0.084 0.28 
  Firm  Size  (250+)          
  0-10  0.276 0.45 0.276 0.45 0.134 0.34 0.129 0.33 
  11-50  0.158 0.36 0.155 0.36 0.167 0.37 0.165 0.37 
  51-250  0.188 0.39 0.185 0.39 0.283 0.45 0.279 0.45 
  Real  Income  2363.131  761.23 2195.5 833.37 2964.7 676.30 2967.5 714.35 
          
  N  3066   12264   5893   23647  
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Table 3: Normalized Differences in Covariates: Treated versus Control and Matched Controls 
 
  Females Males 
  Controls  Matched  Controls Controls Matched  Controls 
Employment Year 1  0.131  -0.028  0.146  -0.024 
Employment Year 2  0.182  -0.027  0.177  -0.020 
Employment Year 3  0.214  -0.018  0.183  -0.015 
Tenure 0.219  0.037  0.129  0.007 
Birth year 1947 or 1944  0.209  0.000  0.085  0.001 
Unemployment (1-3 years)  -0.136  0.029  -0.146  0.023 
Sickness leave (1-3 years)  -0.041  0.056  -0.088  0.046 
Accident benefit   -0.020  0.002  -0.047  0.001 
Firm Employment Dynamics  -0.038  -0.005  -0.029  -0.001 
White-Collar-Worker 0.261  0.016  0.178  0.014 
Federal States (Vienna)        
Burgenland -0.010  0.000  -0.072  0.000 
Carinthia 0.046  0.002  -0.002  0.000 
Lower Austria  -0.030  0.000  -0.061  0.001 
Upper Austria  0.107  0.006  0.083  0.007 
Salzburg 0.118  0.006  0.131  0.003 
Styria -0.032  0.002  -0.038  0.002 
Tyrol -0.012  0.003  -0.003  0.003 
Vorarlberg -0.113  0.001  -0.103  0.001 
Unknown -0.076  0.001  -0.034  0.003 
Industry (Other Services)        
Unkown 0.044  0.003  0.009  0.000 
Agriculture -0.028  0.000  0.005  0.000 
Energy/Mining 0.026  0.000  0.030  0.000 
Manufactoring 0.169  0.003  0.205  -0.008 
Construction 0.084  0.002  -0.127  -0.001 
Trade -0.002  0.001  0.045  0.005 
Hotels and Restaurants  -0.089  0.002  -0.072  0.000 
Transport 0.003  0.003  -0.145  0.001 
Financial Intermediation  0.096  0.000  0.057  -0.001 
Business Activities  -0.057  0.003  -0.010  0.001 
Public Administration  -0.126  -0.007  -0.133  -0.002 
Firm Size (250+)         
0-10 -0.007  0.001  -0.111  0.010 
11-50 -0.051  0.006  -0.084  0.004 
51-250 -0.017  0.004  0.038  0.006 
Real Income  0.571  0.148  0.309  -0.003 













2 S is the sample variance of  i X in the relevant 
subsample. The first column shows the difference between treated and control groups, the second column the difference 
between treated and matched control group. 17 
Table 4: Causal labour market effects of OAPT-scheme: cumulative effects three to five years 
after programme entrance (SE in parenthesis) 
 
 Cumulated effects over ... years  Male Female 
 Employment    
   3 years (in days)  61.1 (5.2)  51.3 (7.3) 
   4 years (in days)  15.1 (7.0)  23.3 (9.9) 
   5 years (in days)  -35.8 (8.1)  -17.3 (11.7) 
 Full-time employment
(1)    
   3 years (in percentage points)  -31.5% (0.42%)  -27.4% (0.58%) 
   4 years (in percentage points)  -28.9% (0.42%).  -24.7% (0.59%) 
   5 years (in percentage points)  -26.2% (0.40%)  -22.6% (0.56%) 
 Unemployment    
   3 years (in days)  -26.4 (2.1)  -32.8 (2.9) 
   4 years (in days)  -32.5 (2.8)  -38.4 (3.7) 
   5 years (in days)  -37.5 (3.1)  -43.2 (4.5) 
(1) calculated as (difference in days in full-time equivalents) over days in the sample 




























Figure 2: Employment effect over time by gender (in days per year) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 